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Abstract—In this paper, we study the interdependency be-
tween the power grid and the communication network used
to control the grid. A communication node depends on the
power grid in order to receive power for operation, and a
power node depends on the communication network in order
to receive control signals for safe operation. We demonstrate
that these dependencies can lead to cascading failures, and it
is essential to consider the power flow equations for studying the
behavior of such interdependent networks. We propose a two-
phase control policy to mitigate the cascade of failures. In the
first phase, our control policy finds the non-avoidable failures
that occur due to physical disconnection. In the second phase,
our algorithm redistributes the power so that all the connected
communication nodes have enough power for operation and
no power lines overload. We perform a sensitivity analysis to
evaluate the performance of our control policy, and show that our
control policy achieves close to optimal yield for many scenarios.
This analysis can help design robust interdependent grids and
associated control policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main challenges for sustainability of future
power grids is the increased variability and uncertainty caused
by integrating renewable sources into the grid. In order to
address this challenge, the future grid must become equipped
with real-time monitoring and be controlled with fast and
efficient control algorithms [1].
The monitoring and control of today’s power grid relies
on a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
system. One of the main control operations is the Automatic
Generation Control (AGC) which is used to match power
supply with demand in the grid through frequency control.
This is done both at the local (generator) level, and the
wide-area level. AGC systems rely on communications in
order to disseminate control information, and the lack of
communications, or even delay in communications can cause
AGC systems to malfunction and fail, leading to wide-scale
power outages [2]–[5].
In August 2003, lack of real-time monitoring and rapid
control decisions for mitigating failures led to a catastrophic
blackout which affected 50 million people in Northeast Amer-
ica. According to the final report of the 2003 blackout [6],
this event started with the loss of transmission lines in Ohio
due to inadequate tree trimming. However, the operators did
not realize these failures due to insufficient monitoring; thus,
no remedial action was taken at that time. In the subsequent
hour, several transmission lines and generators tripped due to
overheating of power lines and local protections1 in generators.
This work was supported by DTRA grant HDTRA1-13-1-0021.
1Local protections are systems that trip the generator when abnormal
changes such as over/under frequency occur in the grid.
These initial failures triggered a very fast cascade, which
occurred in less than 5 minutes and led to a full blackout in
the Northeast United States and parts of Canada. The reports
in [7] and [8] indicate that the reason for tripping of many
generators and transmission lines was power imbalance in the
control areas and lack of communication between the operators
for mitigating the failures. It is thus essential to design a
communication network together with control policies that
facilitate widespread monitoring of the power grid, and enables
the power grid to react to rapid changes and unexpected
failures in the network.
Moreover, for cost and sustainability considerations, the
communication equipment often receives the power for oper-
ation directly from the power grid. However, this creates a
strong interdependency between the two networks, where the
operation of the power grid is dependent on receiving control
signals from the communication network, and the operation of
the communication network is dependent on receiving power
from the power grid.
The concept of interdependencies between infrastructures
was first introduced in [9]. In [10], Rosato et al. studied the
impact of failures in the power grid on the performance of
communication networks. In 2010, Buldyrev et al. [11] pre-
sented a model for analyzing the robustness of interdependent
random networks and investigated asymptotic connectivity to a
“giant component”. They showed that interdependent networks
are more vulnerable to failures than individual networks in
isolation. The authors in [12] modified the model of [11] to
account for connectivity to generators and control centers, and
studied connectivity in the non-asymptotic regime.
Figure 1(a) shows the impact of failures on interdependent
networks by considering two random Erdos-Renyi graphs and
a one-to-one interdependency between power and commu-
nication nodes. The result of our analysis shows that the
interdependent networks are more vulnerable to failures than
isolated networks, and there is a notable drop in the size of
the largest connected component when the percentage of initial
node removals is more than 50% of total nodes. These results
are in fact similar to those obtained by Buldyrev’s model in
[11].
However, in a power grid the flows are driven by Kirchoff’s
laws, and cannot be described by a network flow model. Thus,
when a failure occurs in a power grid, the power flow is
redistributed on the the rest of the network and some elements
could overload and fail, leading to “Cascading Failures”. Since
this behavior is not captured in the abstract models of [11],
[12], we generated random power grids and implemented the
model of cascading failures from [13] in conjunction with the
model introduced in [12]. As can be seen from Figure 1(b)
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when taking power failure cascades into account, there exists
no large component for any size of initial failure. Thus, it
is critical to consider the actual power flow in analyzing the
behavior of the power grid.
(a) Random Erdos-Renyi Graph - The size of largest component is
close to the size of network for small sizes of failure, and there is a
drop at a failure rate of about 50%.
(b) Random Power Grid - No large component exists for any size of
failure.
Fig. 1. Ratio of largest component to the number of remaining nodes for
different sizes of initial failures; Each network has 500 nodes with expected
degree 4. We randomly selected 1/5th of the nodes in the power grid and
communication network as generators and control centers, respectively, and
there is one-to-one interdependency between the two networks. For the power
grid, we considered unit reactance for all power lines, and attributed a random
amount of power in the range [1000, 2000] to all generators and loads.
Figure 1(b) focused on connectivity. However, in power
grids, the metric of interest is yield, which is the percentage
of served load, not the the size of largest component. Figure 2
shows that the yield in an interdependent power grid is much
smaller than the yield in an isolated power grid.
Fig. 2. Comparing Yield in single and interdependent Power Grid after
cascading failures. Increasing the size of failure results in a smaller yield.
As was discussed previously, it is necessary to design
a communication network intertwined with the power grid
in order to provide real-time monitoring and control for the
grid. Therefore, a proper analysis of interdependent networks
should account for the availability of control schemes that can
mitigate cascading failures. In this paper, we propose a new
load shedding scheme to control the cascade of failures both
inside and between the networks. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first attempt to design control policies for
mitigating failures in interdependent networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We explain
the model of interdependent power grid and communication
network in Section II. In Section III, we present a simple
control policy followed by a load control policy that mitigate
the cascading failures in interdependent networks in one stage.
Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis for our load control
policy in Section IVand conclude in Section V.
II. MODEL
An interdependent network consists of three subnetworks:
Power grid, communication network and interdependency net-
work. In the following, we will explain the model of each
subnetwork.
A. Power Grid
The power grid can be modeled as a graph GP = (VP , EP )
where VP and EP are power nodes and lines, respectively.
There are three types of power nodes in a grid: Generators that
generate power, Loads that consume power and Substations
that neither generate nor consume power. The flow in power
lines cannot be controlled manually; instead, it is determined
based on the principles of electricity. In order to analyze the
behavior of the power grid, we use the well-known DC power
flow model, explained in equation 1, that has been widely
used in the literature (see [14] for a survey on the power flow
models).
Let P be a |VP |× 1 vector such that Pi denotes the power
injection at power node i ∈ VP . Let A ∈ R|VP |×|EP | be
the adjacency matrix where Aij = 1 if link j starts from
node i, Aij = −1 if link j ends in node i and Aij = 0
otherwise. Moreover, let X ∈ R|EP |×|EP | be the reactance
matrix associated to the power grid where Xii denotes the
reactance of ith power line and Xij = 0 for j 6= i. Let
f ∈ R|EP |×1 be the vector of power flows in transmission
lines and θ ∈ R|VP |×1 denote the phases at all power nodes.
A DC power flow can be modeled as follows.
Af = P (1a)
AT θ = Xf (1b)
Constraint 1a is a network flow constraint which guarantees
that power at every node is balanced. In addition, constraint
1b replicates Ohm’s law where the amount of power flowing
in a power line is equal to the difference in phase angles θi
and θj divided by the reactance of line (i, j).
When a power node or line fails, its load is shifted to other
elements of the grid. During this process, the flow in one or
more lines may be pushed beyond their capacity which leads
to the failure of the overloaded lines. Similarly, failure of these
lines redistributes power and may lead to further “Cascading
Failures”.
The cascade of failures in the power grid is a very complex
phenomena, and several models have been introduced for
explaining the behavior of cascading failures (see for example
[13], [15]–[17]). In this paper, we will use the deterministic
model explained in [13]. In this model, each power line is
associated with a capacity which is considered to be a factor
of safety (FoS) typically set to 1.2 times the amount of flow on
that line. When a failure occurs, the power will be redistributed
to the rest of the grid and the lines with flow more than their
capacity will fail. The cascading model can be explained using
the following steps.
1) Balance the power in the grid; i.e. if the grid is over-
loaded, decrease the amount of power at all loads uni-
formly to match the generation and if the grid is under-
loaded, decrease the amount of power at all generators to
match the load.
2) Resolve the DC power flow model in equations 1.
3) Remove all the overloaded power lines; i.e. f > fmax.
4) If there is no overloaded lines in step 3, the cascade ends.
Otherwise, repeat the four steps.
B. Communication Network
The communication and control network can be modeled
as a graph GC = (VC , EC) where VC and EC are commu-
nication nodes and links, respectively. There are two types of
communication nodes: routers that are responsible for trans-
mitting information, and control centers that are responsible
for making control decisions.
In order to have a fully monitored and controlled power
grid, every power node is equipped with a communication
node (router). These nodes receive information from the power
nodes and relay it to the control center through other routers.
The control center makes the control decisions and sends them
back to the routers located at power nodes. In our model, when
a communication node fails, all the communication nodes that
become disconnected from the control centers can no longer
function.
C. Interdependency
1) Dependency of Communication Network on the Power
Grid: The communication nodes receive the power for their
operation from power grid. In order to model this dependency,
we associate each communication node Cj with a load PCj
that is connected to the power grid (Figure 3). Let P reqC be the
required amount of power for operation of the communication
node. Thus, communication node Cj operates if PCj ≥ P reqC
and it fails otherwise.
Fig. 3. Modeling Dependency of Communication Network on Power Grid
In our model, the loads associated to the communication
nodes are located in the distribution system and multiple
communication nodes can receive power from one power node
in the transmission system (Figure 3). We assume that the
communication and control nodes have the highest priority in
the distribution system; thus, they will receive power as long as
the power nodes have sufficient power to meet their demand.
We model this part using network flow equations, where the
sources are the loads Pi in the power grid and the destinations
are loads PCj located at communication nodes.
2) Dependency of Power Grid on the Communication Net-
work: Next, we model the impact of loss of communication
on the operation of the power grid. As explained in the intro-
duction, AGCs control the operation of generators by setting
the amount of power they should generate. If a generator
becomes disconnected from the controller, the local controller
tries to adjust the generation within a small range of changes
in frequency. When the power grid is under stress (e.g. due
to failures in the grid), power imbalance can lead to rapid
frequency changes; in which case local protection schemes
will be activated and trip the generators [4]–[6]. Similarly, if a
substation loses its control, then the relays cannot be accessed
remotely and when the system is under stress, transmission
lines will be overloaded and trip. Based on the 2003 blackout
report, the large power imbalance in the system and lack
of fast control and communication led to tripping of many
transmission lines and generators [6].
In this paper, we analyze the cascade of failures in the
power grid when the system is under stress. We say that if a
power node loses its correspondent communication and control
node(s), it cannot be controlled and fails. This is a deterministic
model that can be extended to a probabilistic model where the
power node fails randomly with some probability.
In the next section, we will propose control schemes
that mitigate cascade of failures by shedding loads and re-
dispatching generators. In our analysis, we do not study the
transient behaviors of the grid after applying control decisions.
Instead, we assume that due to a wide-area control imple-
mented by the communication and control network, all the
power nodes are aware of the transient changes in the system
and local protections do not activate. This is essential as in
the 2003 blackout, many generators tripped due to fluctuations
resulting from intentional load sheddings [6].
III. CONTROL POLICIES
A. Simple Load Shedding Mechanism
In this Section, we apply a simple load shedding control
scheme in order to mitigate failures inside the power grid.
This control scheme changes the power injection at power
nodes so that the total power in the grid is balanced and
the flow in transmission lines is below their capacity; thus,
no failure cascades in the power grid. Different versions of
this algorithm exist in the literature (see for example [18],
[19]). The simple mitigation policy can be expressed in terms
of the linear programming formulation in equation 2. Notice
that notation “updated” indicates that the power grid and
communication network have been updated after initial failure.
Let P old, Pnew ∈ R|V updatedP |×1 denote the power injections
at power nodes before and after applying the simple mitigation
policy. Moreover, let vector fmax denote the capacity of power
lines.
The objective function 2a is minimizing the total change in
the power. Constraints 2e and 2f enforce that the only possible
controls are to shed loads and reduce power at generators.
This is due to the fact that generators can ramp down much
faster than they can ramp up. Since this control decision should
be applied very rapidly in order to keep the network stable,
we only allow ramping down; i.e. decreasing generation.
Moreover, we assume there is no minimum threshold on the
amount of power generation or consumption.
minimize eT (|Pnew − P old|) (2a)
subject to Aupdatedf = Pnew (2b)
(Aupdated)T θ = Xf (2c)
f ≤ fmax (2d)
0 ≤ Pnewi ≤ P oldi ∀i ∈ V updatedP,gen (2e)
P oldi ≤ Pnewi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ V updatedP,load (2f)
We apply this mitigation policy to the random interdepen-
dent power grid generated in Section I. The only difference is
that communication nodes receive power only from loads; thus,
it is not a fully one-to-one interdependent topology. However,
we try to create as many one-to-one interdependencies as
possible; i.e a load is dependent on the communication node
that it provides power for. Previous studies have shown that
one-to-one interdependent networks are more robust to failures
[12]. We observed that although applying this control policy
can mitigate failures inside power grid, the failures still cascade
between the communication network and the power grid. Thus,
we apply the control algorithm iteratively until no further
failures occur. Clearly, the yield in any interdependent topology
would be upperbounded by the yield in an isolated power grid.
We use this upperbound to examine the performance of our
control scheme.
Fig. 4. Applying Simple Mitigation Policy to Interdependent Power Grids
for controlling Cascading failures. Here, the total power required by commu-
nication network is 10−4 times total load in the power grid.
Figure 4 shows the yield after applying the simple miti-
gation policy. It can be seen that although the control policy
has improved the yield (when the failure rate is small), there
is a dramatic drop at the beginning and the control policy
can not survive any failure larger than 10% of the network.
This is due to the fact that loss of loads leads to the loss of
communication nodes that are used to control the generators
and thus, the generators fail. Therefore, it is much harder
to mitigate the cascading failures in interdependent networks.
This simple policy is meant to demonstrate that even simple
controls can reduce cascades. Inspired by this observation, we
develop a control scheme that aims to keep communication
nodes operating.
B. Load Control Mitigation Policy
It was seen in Section III-A that a simple mitigation policy
cannot mitigate failures in interdependent networks, as failures
in the power grid propagate to the communication network
and cause additional failures both inside the communication
network and in the power grid. In order to avoid such prop-
agations, we propose a novel control policy that consists of
two phases: in the first phase, it predicts the non-avoidable
failures in the power grid and the communication network
and removes these nodes from the network. In the second
phase, it changes the power injection at power nodes so that
(1) power in all transmission lines is below their capacity and
(2) all the remaining communication nodes keep operating;
i.e. PCj ≥ P reqC . This guarantees that no further failures occur
in the power grid and that the failures do not propagate to
the communication network. Thus, the cascade of failures will
be mitigated in one stage. In the following, we explain these
phases in more details.
1) Phase I: In this phase, we ignore the power flows in
the power grid and find the nodes that their failure cannot be
avoided by changing the power injection at nodes due to loss
of connectivity. Algorithm I describes how to find such failures
in polynomial time.
input : Topology of interdependent network and the set of
initial node removals
repeat
1) For every power node i, check if there exists a path
from a generator to node i and it receives an incoming
edge from the communication network;
2) For every communication node j, check if there exists
a path from a control center to node j and it receives
an incoming edge from power grid;
3) Remove all the nodes that do not satisfy the properties
in steps 1 and 2;
4) Remove all isolated generators;
5) Remove all the links connected to the removed nodes.
until No node can be removed;
output: Set of all removed nodes
Algorithm 1: Cascade Algorithm
2) Phase II: In this phase, our objective is to find a set of
feasible power injections so that the minimum amount of load
is shed and no control node fails due to loss of power. Let
ECP denote the adjacency matrix modeling the dependency
of communication network on loads. Let vector h denote the
amount of power flowing from loads located in the power
transmission grid Pi to loads located in the power distribution
grid PCj that support the communication network (See Figure
3). Moreover, let b be a two part power vector. The first
part represents the amount of power injection at loads in the
transmission grid with positive sign as these are source nodes;
i.e. −Pi since loads Pi are originally modeled with negative
values. Similarly, the second part represents the amount of
power injection at loads in the distribution grid with negative
sign as these are destination nodes; i.e. PCj since loads PCj
are originally modeled with negative values. Moreover, notice
that notation “updated” indicates that the power grid and
communication network have been updated by removing the
nodes that fail in Phase I.
minimize eT (|Pnew − P old|) (3a)
subject to Aupdatedf = Pnew (3b)
(Aupdated)T θ = Xf (3c)
f ≤ fmax, ∀(i, j) ∈ EupdatedP (3d)
0 ≤ Pnewi ≤ P oldi ∀i ∈ V updatedP,gen (3e)
P oldi ≤ Pnewi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ V updatedP,load (3f)
PCj ≤ −P reqC ∀j ∈ V updatedC (3g)∑
EupdatedCP h = b (3h)
h ≥ 0 (3i)
Constraint 3g guarantees that every remaining communica-
tion node receives the minimum amount of power required for
operation. Constraint 3h models the power flowing from the
power grid to the communication network with a network flow
model. Constraint 3i shows that the direction of power flow is
from power nodes to communication nodes. The combination
of these three constraints changes the power injection at power
nodes so that the communication nodes remaining from Phase
I will continue operating. The rest of constraints are similar to
the Simple mitigation policy and set the power injections so
that no transmission line is overloaded. Similarly, the objective
function is minimizing the total amount of load shedding. Note
that this ILP may be infeasible. In such cases the yield would
be zero, showing that our control policy is not capable of
controlling the failures in the network.
Fig. 5. Comparing performances of control policies
Figure 5 compares the performance of load control miti-
gation and simple mitigation policies. It can be seen that the
yield after applying the load control policy is improved with
respect to the simple mitigation policy and it is very close to
the upperbound.
IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the performance of our control policy with
respect to changes in the communication network and the
interdependency between the power grid and communication
network. The parameters we study are the amount of power
that communication nodes require (PCj ), size of communi-
cation network, the average number of power nodes sup-
porting each communication node, namely “Communication
Interdependence Degree” and finally, the average number of
communication nodes supporting each power node, namely
“Power Interdependence Degree”.
We generate 30 random networks and test their feasibility
by applying our control policy. If the entire network fails in the
first phase, the network is not feasible; i.e. no control policy
can survive it. We average the yield found by our control policy
over the feasible networks.
We define the “Load Factor” as the ratio of power required
by the communication network to the total load in the power
grid. In the previous simulations LF was set to be 10−4.
Figure 6 shows that by increasing LF, the yield decreases as
it is harder to provide a larger amount of power for all loads
supporting communication network.
Fig. 6. Impact of Load Factor on the Yield; 500 communication nodes; 20%
of nodes are randomly selected as control centers
We analyze the performance of our policy with respect to
the size of communication network; i.e. number of communi-
cation nodes. Figure 7 shows that for small values of LF, the
larger networks have higher yield. However, by increasing LF,
the yield of larger networks decreases more; thus, the smaller
networks perform better for large LF.
Fig. 7. Impact of Number of Communication Nodes on the Yield; 20%
of communication nodes are randomly selected as control centers; initial
removal=5%
The next parameter that we study is the average number
of power nodes that support every communication network
(interdependence degree). Figure 8 shows that the average
yield increases by increasing the interdependence degree.
Moreover, it shows that for large enough degree (here degree
of 4) networks with different sizes have similar yield.
Finally, we investigate the impact of the average number of
communication nodes supporting each power node. It can be
Fig. 8. Impact of Communication Interdependence Degree on the Yield;
initial removal=10%; load factor=0.1
seen from Figure 9 that increasing degree has positive impact
on the yield and feasibility; however, it is not as strong as the
impact of communication interdependence degree. The reason
is due to the structure of our control policy that tends to survive
all of the communication network. Thus, if the control policy is
feasible, the communication network remains operating, which
results in the operation of the power nodes supported by these
communication nodes. Therefore, in these scenarios, increasing
the support for power grid cannot help. The small improvement
that we see here is related to the reduction of failures due to
disconnection.
Fig. 9. Impact of Power Interdependence Degree on the Yield; initial
removal=10%; load factor=0.1
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that it is essential to consider
the power flow equations for analyzing the behavior of in-
terdependent power grid and communication networks. We
argued that in order to analyze the robustness of interdepen-
dent networks, one should consider the control schemes for
controlling cascading failures both inside and between the
power grid and communication network. We proposed a new
control scheme that mitigates failures in one stage and keeps
the yield close to the maximum possible value. Our policy only
allowed the failures due to disconnection from generators and
control centers. Thus, a connectivity model can be used to
describe the process of cascading failures in interdependent
topologies. In addition, we tested the performance of our load
control policy with respect to changes in several parameters
such as load fraction (power needed by communication) and
interdependence degree.
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